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Deterministic Calibration and Nash Equilibrium
Sham M. Kakade and Dean P. Foster
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Abstract. We provide a natural learning process in which the joint fre-
quency of empirical play converges into the set of convex combinations
of Nash equilibria. In this process, all players rationally choose their ac-
tions using a public prediction made by a deterministic, weakly calibrated
algorithm. Furthermore, the public predictions used in any given round
of play are frequently close to some Nash equilibrium of the game.
1 Introduction
Perhaps the most central question for justifying any game theoretic equilibrium
as a general solution concept is: can we view the equilibrium as a convergent
point of a sensible learning process? Unfortunately for Nash equilibria, there
are currently no learning algorithms in the literature in which play generally
converges (in some sense) to a Nash equilibrium of the one shot game, short of
exhaustive search — see Foster and Young [forthcoming] for perhaps the most
general result in which players sensibly search through hypothesis. In contrast,
there is a long list of special cases (eg zero sum games, 2x2 games, assump-
tions about the players’ prior subjective beliefs) in which there exist learning
algorithms that have been shown to converge (a representative but far from ex-
haustive list would be Robinson [1951], Milgrom and Roberts [1991], Kalai and
Lehrer [1993], Fudenberg and Levine [1998], Freund and Schapire [1999]).
If we desire that the mixed strategies themselves converge to a Nash equi-
librium, then a recent result by Hart and Mas-Colell [2003] shows that this is,
in general, not possible under a certain class of learning rules 1. Instead, one
can examine the convergence of the joint frequency of the empirical play, which
has the advantage of being an observable quantity. This has worked well in the
case of a similar equilibrium concept, namely correlated equilibrium (Foster and
Vohra [1997], Hart and Mas-Colell [2000]). However, for Nash equilibria, previ-
ous general results even for this weaker form of convergence are limited to some
form of exhaustive search (though see Foster and Young [forthcoming]).
In this paper, we provide a learning process in which the joint frequency of
empirical play converges to a Nash equilibrium, if it is unique. More generally,
convergence is into the set of convex combinations of Nash equilibria (where
the empirical play could jump from one Nash equilibrium to another infinitely
1 They show that, in general, there exists no continuous time dynamics which converge
to a Nash equilibrium (even if the equilibrium is unique), with the natural restriction
that a players mixed strategy is updated without using the knowledge of the other
players’ utility functions.
2often). Our learning process is the most traditional one: players make predictions
of their opponents and take best responses to their predictions. Central to our
learning process is the use of public predictions formed by an “accurate” (eg
calibrated) prediction algorithm.
We now outline the main contributions of this paper.
“Almost” Deterministic Calibration Formulating sensible prediction algo-
rithms is a notoriously difficult task in the game theoretic setting 2. A rather
minimal requirement for any prediction algorithm is that it should be calibrated
(see Dawid [1982]). An informal explanation of calibration would go something
like this. Suppose each day a weather forecaster makes some prediction, say p,
of the chance that it rains the next day. Now from the subsequence of days
on which the forecaster announced p, compute the empirical frequency that it
actually rained the next day, and call this ρ(p). Crudely speaking, calibration
requires that ρ(p) equal p, if the forecast p is used often.
If the weather acts adversarially, then Oakes [1985] and Dawid [1985] show
that a deterministic forecasting algorithm will not be always be calibrated. How-
ever, Foster and Vohra [1998] show that calibration is almost surely guaranteed
with a randomized forecasting rule, ie where the forecasts are chosen using pri-
vate randomization and the forecasts are hidden from the weather until the
weather makes its decision to rain or not. Of course, this solution makes it dif-
ficult for a weather forecaster to publicly announce a prediction.
Although stronger notions of calibration have been proposed (see Kalai et al.
[1999]), here we actually consider a weaker notion 3. Our contribution is to
provide a deterministic algorithm that is always weakly calibrated. Rather than
precisely defining weak calibration here, we continue to with our example to
show how this deterministic algorithm can be used to obtain calibrated forecasts
in the standard sense.
Assume the weather forecaster uses our deterministic algorithm and publicly
announces forecasts to a number of observers interested in the weather. Say the
following forecasts are made over some period of 5 days:
0.8606, 0.2387, 0.57513, 0.4005, 0.069632, . . .
How can an interested observer make calibrated predictions using this announced
forecast? In our setting, an observer can just randomly round the forecasts in or-
der to calibrate. For example, if the observer rounds to the second digit, then on
the first day, the observer will privately predict .87 with probability .06 and .86
otherwise, and, on the second day, the private predictions will be 0.24 with prob-
ability 0.87 and 0.23 otherwise. Under this scheme, the asymptotic calibration
error of the observer will, almost surely, be small (and if the observer rounded
to the third digit, this error would be yet even smaller).
2 Subjective notions of probability fall prey to a host of impossibility results — crudely,
Alice wants to predict Bob while Bob wants to predict Alice, which leads to a
feedback loop (if Alice and Bob are both rational). See Foster and Young [2001].
3 We use the word “weak” in the technical sense of weak convergence of measures (see
Billingsley [1968]) rather than how it used by Kalai et al. [1999].
3Unlike previous calibrated algorithms, this deterministic algorithm provides
a meaningful forecast, which can be calibrated using only randomized rounding.
Nash Convergence The existence of a deterministic forecasting scheme leaves
open the possibility that all players can rationally use some public forecast,
since each player is guaranteed to form calibrated predictions (regardless of how
the other players behave). For example, say some public forecaster provides a
prediction of the full joint distribution of all n players. The algorithm discussed
above can be generalized such that each player can use this prediction (with
randomized rounding) to construct a prediction of the other players. Each player
can then use their own prediction to choose a best response.
We formalize this scheme later, but point out that our (weakly) calibrated
forecasting algorithm only needs to observe the history of play (and does not
require any information about the players’ utility functions). Furthermore, there
need not be any “publicly announced” forecast provided to every player at each
round — alternatively, each player could have knowledge of the deterministic
forecasting algorithm and could perform the computation themselves.
Now Foster and Vohra [1997] showed that if players make predictions that
satisfy the rather minimal calibration condition, then the joint frequency of the
empirical play converges into the set of correlated equilibria. Hence, it is im-
mediate that in our setting, convergence is into the set of correlated equilibria.
However, we can prove the stronger condition that the joint frequency of em-
pirical play converges into the set of convex combinations of Nash equilibria,
a smaller set than that of correlated equilibria. This directly implies that the
average payoff achieved by each player is at least the player’s payoff under some
Nash equilibrium — a stronger guarantee than achieving a (possibly smaller)
correlated equilibrium payoff.
This setting deals with the coordination problem of “which Nash equilibrium
to play?” in a natural manner. The setting does not arbitrarily force play to any
single equilibrium and allows the possibility that players could (jointly) switch
play from one Nash equilibrium to another — perhaps infinitely often. Further-
more, although play converges to the convex combinations of Nash equilibria,
we have the stronger result that the public forecasts themselves are frequently
close to some Nash equilibrium (not general combinations of them). Of course if
the Nash equilibrium is unique, then the empirical play converges to it.
The convergence rate, until the empirical play is an approximate Nash equi-
librium, is O(
√
T ) (where T is the number of rounds of play), with constants
that are exponential in both the number of players and actions. Hence, our set-
ting does not lead to a polynomial time algorithm for computing an approximate
Nash equilibrium (which is currently an important open problem).
2 Deterministic Calibration
We first describe the online prediction setting. There is a finite outcome space
Ω = {1, 2, . . . |Ω|}. Let X be an infinite sequence of outcomes, whose t-th
element, Xt, indicates the outcome on time t. For convenience, we represent
4the outcome Xt = (Xt[1], Xt[2], . . . Xt[|Ω|]) as a binary vector in {0, 1}|Ω| that
indicates which state at time t was realized — if the realized state was i, then the
i-th component of Xt is 1 and all other components are 0. Hence, 1T
∑T
t=1Xt is
the empirical frequency of the outcomes up to time T and is a valid probability
distribution.
A forecasting method, F , is simply a function from a sequence of outcomes to
a probability distribution over Ω. The forecast that F makes in time t is denoted
by ft = F (X1, X2, . . . , Xt−1) (clearly, the t-th forecast must be made without
knowledge of Xt). Here ft = (ft[1], ft[2], . . . ft[|Ω|]), where the ith component is
the forecasted probability that state i will be realized in time t.
2.1 Weak Calibration
We now define a quantity to determine if F is calibrated with respect to some
probability distribution p. Define Ip,²(f) to be a “test” function indicating if the
forecast f is ²-close to p, ie
Ip,²(f) =
{
1 if |f − p| ≤ ²
0 else
where |f | denotes the l1 norm, ie |f | =
∑
k∈Ω
∣∣f [k]∣∣. We define the calibration
error µT of F with respect to Ip,² as:
µT (Ip,², X, F ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ip,²(ft)(Xt − ft)
Note that Xt − ft is the immediate error (which is a vector) and the above
error µT measures this instantaneous error on those times when the forecast was
²-close to p.
We say that F is calibrated if for all sequences X and all test functions Ip,²,
the calibration error tends to 0, ie
µT (Ip,², X, F )→ 0
as T tends to infinity. As discussed in the Introduction, there exist no determin-
istic rules F that are calibrated (Dawid [1985], Oakes [1985]). However, Foster
and Vohra [1998] show that there exist randomized forecasting rules F (ie F
is a randomized function) which are calibrated. Namely, there exists a random-
ized F such that for all sequences X and for all test functions Ip,², the error
µT (Ip,², X, F ) → 0 as T tends to infinity, with probability 1 (where the proba-
bility is taken with respect to the randomization used by the forecasting scheme).
We now generalize this definition of the calibration error by defining it with
respect to arbitrary test functions w, where a test function is defined as a map-
ping from probability distributions into the interval [0, 1]. We define the calibra-
tion error µT of F with respect to the test function w as:
µT (w,X,F ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
w(ft)(Xt − ft)
5This is consistent with the previous definition if we set w=Ip,².
Let W be the set of all test functions which are Lipschitz continuous func-
tions 4. We say that F is weakly calibrated if for all sequences X and all w ∈W ,
µT (w,X,F )→ 0
as T tends to infinity. Also, we say that F is uniformly, weakly calibrated if for
all w ∈W ,
sup
X
µT (w,X,F )→ 0
as T tends to infinity. The latter condition is strictly stronger. Our first main
result follows.
Theorem 1. (Deterministic Calibration) There exists a deterministic forecast-
ing rule which is uniformly, weakly calibrated.
The proof of this theorem is constructive and is presented in section 4.
2.2 Randomized Rounding for Standard Calibration
We now show how to achieve calibration in the standard sense (with respect to
the indicator functions Ip,²), using a deterministic weakly calibrated algorithm
along with some randomized rounding. Essentially, the algorithm rounds any
forecast to some element in a finite set, V , of forecasts. In the example in the
Introduction, the set V was the set of probability distributions which are specified
up to the second digit of precision.
Let ∆ be the simplex in which the forecasts live (∆ ⊂ R|Ω|). Consider some
triangulation of ∆. By this, we mean that ∆ is partitioned into a set of simplices
such that any two simplices intersect in either a common face, common vertex,
or not at all. Let V be the vertex set of this triangulation. Note that any point
p lies in some simplex in this triangulation, and, slightly abusing notation, let
V (p) be the set of corners for this simplex 5. Informally, our rounding scheme
rounds a point p to nearby points in V — p will be randomly mapped into V (p)
in the natural manner.
To formalize this, associate a test function wv(p) with each v ∈ V as follows.
Each distribution p can be uniquely written as a weighted average of its neigh-
boring vertices, V (p). For v ∈ V (p), let us define the test functions wv(p) to be
these linear weights, so they are uniquely defined by the linear equation:
p =
∑
v∈V (p)
wv(p)v .
For v /∈ V (p), we define wv(p) = 0. A useful property is that∑
v∈V (p)
wv(p) =
∑
v∈V
wv(p) = 1
4 The function g is Lipschitz continuous if g is continuous and if there exists a finite
constant λ such that |g(a)− g(b)| ≤ λ|a− b|.
5 If this simplex is not unique, ie if p lies on a face, then choose any adjacent simplex
6which holds since p is an average (under wv) of the points in V (p).
The functions wv imply a natural randomized rounding function. Define
the randomized rounding function RoundV as follows: for some distribution p,
RoundV (p) chooses v ∈ V (p) with probability wv(p). We make the following
assumptions about a randomized rounding forecasting rule FV with respect to
F and triangulation V :
1. F is weakly calibrated.
2. If F makes the forecast ft at time t, then FV makes the random forecast
RoundV (ft) at this time.
3. The (l1) diameter of any simplex in the triangulation is less than ², ie for
any p and q in the same simplex, |p− q| ≤ ².
An immediate corollary to the previous theorem is that FV is ²-calibrated with
respect to the indicator test functions.
Corollary 1. For all X, the calibration error of FV is asymptotically less than
², ie the probability (taken with respect to the randomization used by RoundV )
that
|µT (Ip,², X, FV )| ≤ ²
tends to 1 as T tends to infinity.
To see this, note that the instantaneous error at time t, Xt−RoundV (ft), has
an expected value of
∑
v wv(ft)(Xt − v) which is ²-close to
∑
v wv(ft)(Xt − ft).
The sum of this latter quantity converges to 0 by the previous theorem. The
(martingale) strong law of large numbers then suffices to prove this corollary.
This randomized scheme is “almost deterministic” in the sense that at each
time t the forecast made by FV is ²-close to a deterministic forecast. Interestingly,
this shows that an adversarial nature cannot foil the forecaster, even if nature
almost knows the forecast that will be used every round.
3 Publicly Calibrated Learning
First, some definitions are in order. Consider a game with n players. Each player
i has a finite action space Ai. The joint action space is then A = Πni=1Ai. As-
sociated with each player is a payoff function ui : A → [0, 1]. The interpretation
is that if the joint action a ∈ A is taken by all players then player i will receive
payoff ui(a).
If p is a joint distribution over A−i = Πj 6=iAj , then we define BRi(p) to be
the set of all actions which are best responses for player i to p, ie it is the set
of all a ∈ Ai which maximize the function Ea−i∼p[ui(a, a−i)]. It is also useful
to define ²-BRi(p) as the set of all actions which are ²-best responses to p, ie if
a ∈ ²-BRi(p) then the utility Ea−i∼p[ui(a, a−i)] is ²-close to the maximal utility
maxa′∈AEa−i∼p[ui(a
′, a−i)].
Given some distribution f over A, it is convenient to denote the marginal
distribution of f over A−i as f−i. We say a distribution f is a Nash equilibrium
(or, respectively, ²-Nash equilibrium) if the following two conditions hold:
71. f is a product distribution.
2. If action a ∈ Ai has positive probability under f then a is in BRi(f−i) (or,
respectively, in ²-BRi(f−i)).
We denote the set of all Nash equilibria (or ²-Nash equilibria) by NE (or NE²).
3.1 Using Public Forecasts
A standard setting for learning in games is for each player i to make some forecast
p over A−i at time t. The action taken by player i during this time would then
be some action that is a best response to p.
Now consider the setting in which all players observe some forecast ft over all
n players, ie the forecast ft is a full joint probability distribution over Ω = A.
Each player is only interested in the prediction of other players, so player i
can just use the marginal distribution (ft)−i to form a prediction for the other
players. In order to calibrate, some randomized rounding is in order.
More formally, we define the public learning process with respect to a fore-
casting rule F and vertex set V as follows: At each time t, F provides a prediction
ft and each player i:
1. makes a prediction p = RoundV (ft)
2. chooses a best response to p−i
We make the following assumptions.
1. F is weakly calibrated.
2. Ties for a best response are broken with a deterministic, stationary rule.
3. If p and q are in the same simplex (of the triangulation) then |p− q| ≤ ².
It is straightforward to see that the forecasting rule of player i, which is
(RoundV (ft))−i, is calibrated regardless of how the other players behave. By
the previous corollary the randomized scheme RoundV (ft) will be ²-calibrated.
Player i can then simply ignore the direction i of this forecast (by marginalizing)
and hence has an ²-calibrated forecast over the reduced space A−i.
Thus, the rather minimal accuracy condition that players make calibrated
predictions is satisfied, and, in this sense, it is rational for players to use the
forecasts made by F . In fact, the setting of “publicly announced” forecasts is
only one way to view the scheme. Alternatively, one could assume that each
player has knowledge of the deterministic rule F and makes the computations of
ft themselves. Furthermore, F only needs the history of play as an input (and
does not need any knowledge of the players’ utility functions).
It is useful to make the following definitions. Let Convex(Q) be the set of
all convex combinations of distributions in Q 6. Define the distance between a
distribution p and a set Q as:
d(p,Q) = inf
q∈Q
|p− q|
6 If q1, q2, . . . qm ∈ Q then α1q1+α2q2 . . .+αmqm ∈ Convex(Q), where αi are positive
and sum to one.
8Using the result of Foster and Vohra [1997], it is immediate that the frequency
of empirical play in the public learning process will (almost surely) converge
into the set of 2²-correlated equilibria, since the players are making ²-calibrated
predictions, ie
d
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xt, CE2²
)
→ 0
where CE2² is the set of 2²-correlated equilibria. Our second main result shows we
can further restrict the convergent set to convex combinations of Nash equilibria,
a potentially much smaller set than the set of correlated equilibria.
Theorem 2. (Nash Convergence) The joint frequency of empirical play in the
public learning process converges into the set of convex combinations of 2²-Nash
equilibria, ie with probability 1
d
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xt, Convex(NE2²)
)
→ 0
as T goes to infinity. Furthermore, the rule F rarely uses forecasts that are not
close to a 2²-Nash equilibrium — by this, we mean that with probability one
1
T
T∑
t=1
d(ft, NE2²)→ 0
as T goes to infinity.
Since our convergence is with respect to the joint empirical play, an imme-
diate corollary is that the average payoff achieved by each player is at least
the player’s payoff under some 2²-Nash equilibrium. Also, we have the following
corollary showing convergence to NE.
Corollary 2. If F is uniformly, weakly calibrated and if the triangulation V is
made finer (ie if ² is decreased) sufficiently slowly, then the joint frequency of
empirical play converges into the set of convex combinations of NE.
As we stated in the Introduction, we argue that the above result deals with
the coordination problem of “which Nash equilibrium to play?” in a sensible
manner. Though the players cannot be pinned down to play any particular Nash
equilibrium, they do jointly play some Nash equilibrium for long subsequences.
Furthermore, it is public knowledge of which equilibrium is being played since
the predictions ft are frequently close to some Nash equilibrium (not general
combinations of them).
Now of course if the Nash equilibrium is unique, then the empirical play
converges to it. This does not contradict the (impossibility) result of Hart and
Mas-Colell [2003] — crudely, our learning setting keeps track of richer statistics
from the history of play (which is not permitted in their setting).
93.2 The Proof
On some round in which f is forecasted, every player acts according to a fixed
randomized rule. Let pi(f) be this “play distribution” over joint actions A on any
round with forecast f . More precisely, if ft is the forecast at time t, then pi(ft)
is the expected value of Xt given ft. Clearly, pi(f) is a product distribution since
all players choose actions independently (since their randomization is private).
Lemma 1. For all Lipschitz continuous test functions w, with probability 1, we
have
1
τ
τ∑
t=1
w(ft)(ft − pi(ft))→ 0
as τ tends to infinity.
Proof. Consider the stochastic process Yτ = 1τ
∑τ
t=1 w(ft)(Xt − pi(ft)). This
is a martingale average (i.e. τYτ is a martingale), since at every round, the
expected value of Xt is pi(ft). By the martingale strong law we have Yτ →
0 as τ tends to infinity, with probability one. Also, by calibration, we have
1
τ
∑τ
t=1 w(ft)(ft −Xt)→ 0 as τ tends to infinity. Combining these two leads to
the result. uunionsq
We now show that fixed points of pi are approximate Nash equilibria.
Lemma 2. If f = pi(f), then f is a 2²-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that a ∈ Ai has positive probability under pi(f). By definition of
the public learning process, action amust be a best response to some distribution
p−i, where p ∈ V (f). Assumption 3 implies that |p − f | ≤ ², so it follows
that |p−i − f−i| ≤ ². Since the utility of taking a under any distribution q−i is∑
a−i∈A−i q−i[a−i]ui(a, a−i), the previous inequality and boundedness of ui by
1 imply that a must be a 2²-best response to f−i. Furthermore, f is a product
distribution, since pi(f) is one. The result follows. uunionsq
Taken together, these last two lemmas suggest that forecasts which are used
often must be a 2²-Nash equilibrium — the first lemma suggests that forecasts
f which are used often must be equal to pi(f), and the second lemma states that
if this occurs, then f is a 2² Nash equilibrium. We now make this precise.
Define a forecast f to be asymptotically unused if there exists a continuous
test function w such that w(f) = 1 and 1T
∑T
t=1w(ft) → 0. In other words, a
forecast is asymptotically unused if we can find some small neighborhood around
it such that the limiting frequency of using a forecast in this neighborhood is 0.
Lemma 3. If f is not a 2²-Nash equilibrium, then it is asymptotically unused,
with probability one.
Proof. Consider a sequence of ever finer balls around f , and associate a con-
tinuous test function with each ball that is nonzero within the ball. Let r1, r2,
r3, . . . be a sequence of decreasing radii such that ri → 0 as i tends to infinity.
Define the open ball Bi as the set of all points p such that |p−f | < ri. Associate
10
a continuous test function wi with the i-th ball such that: if p /∈ Bi, wi(p) = 0
and if p ∈ Bi, wi(p) > 0, with wi(f) = 1. Clearly, this construction is possible.
Define the radius r′i as the maximal variation of pi within the the i− th ball,
ie r′i = supp,q∈Bi |pi(p) − pi(q)|. Since pi(p) is continuous, then r′i → 0 as i tends
to infinity.
Using the fact that |f − pi(f)| is a constant (for the following first equality),
(
T∑
t=1
wi(ft)
)
|f − pi(f)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
wi(ft)(f − pi(f))
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
wi(ft)
(
(f − ft)− (pi(f)− pi(ft)) + (ft − pi(ft))
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
wi(ft)(f − ft)
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
wi(ft)(pi(f)− pi(ft))
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
wi(ft)(ft − pi(ft))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (ri + r′i)
T∑
t=1
wi(ft) +
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
wi(ft)(ft − pi(ft))
∣∣∣∣∣
where the last step uses the fact that wi(ft) is zero if |ft− f | ≥ ri (ie if ft /∈ Bi)
along with the definitions of ri and r′i.
Now to prove that f is asymptotically unused it suffices to show that there
exists some i such that 1T
∑T
t=1wi(ft)→ 0 as T tends to infinity. For a proof by
contradiction, assume that such an i does not exist. Dividing the above equation
by these sum weights, which are (asymptotically) nonzero by this assumption,
we have
|f − pi(f)| ≤ ri + r′i +
| 1T
∑T
t=1wi(ft)(ft − pi(ft))|
1
T
∑T
t=1wi(ft)
Now by lemma 1, we know the numerator of the last term goes to 0. So, for all
i, we have that |f − pi(f)| ≤ ri + r′i. By taking the limit as i tends to infinity,
we have |f −pi(f)| = 0. Thus f is a 2²-Nash equilibrium by the previous lemma,
which contradicts our assumption on f . uunionsq
We say a set of forecasts Q is asymptotically unused if there exists a contin-
uous test function w such that w(f) = 1 for all f ∈ Q and 1T
∑T
t=1w(ft)→ 0.
Lemma 4. If Q is a compact set of forecasts such that every f ∈ Q is not a
2²-Nash equilibrium, then Q is asymptotically unused, with probability one.
Proof. By the last lemma, we know that each q ∈ Q is asymptotically unused.
Let wq be a test function which proves that q is asymptotically unused. Since
wq is continuous and wq(q) = 1, there exists an open neighborhood around q in
which wq is strictly positive. Let N(q) be this open neighborhood.
11
Clearly the set Q is covered by the (uncountable) union of all open neighbor-
hoods N(q), ie Q ⊂ ∪q∈QN(q). Since Q is compact, every cover of Q by open
sets has a finite subcover. In particular, there exists a finite sized set C ⊂ Q
such that Q ⊂ ∪c∈CN(c).
Let us define the test function w = 1|C|
∑
c∈C wc. We use this function to
prove that Q is asymptotically unused (we modify it later to have value 1 on
Q). This function is continuous, since each wc is continuous. Also, w is non-zero
for all q ∈ Q. To see this, for every q ∈ Q there exists some c ∈ C such that
q ∈ N(c) since C is a cover, and this implies that wc(q) > 0. Furthermore, for
every c ∈ C, 1T
∑T
t=1wc(ft) → 0 with probability one and since |C| is finite, we
have that 1T
∑T
t=1w(ft)→ 0 with probability one.
SinceQ is compact, w takes on its minimum value onQ. Let α = minq∈Q w(q),
so α > 0 since w is positive on Q. Hence, the function w(q)/α is at least 1 on
Q. Now the function w′(q) = min{w(q)/α, 1} is continuous, one on Q, and with
probability one, 1T
∑T
t=1w
′(ft) → 0. Therefore, w′ proves that Q is asymptoti-
cally unused. uunionsq
It is now straightforward to prove theorem 2. We start by proving that
1
T
∑T
t=1d(ft, NE2²) → 0 with probability one. It suffices to prove that with
probability one, for all δ > 0 we have that
1
T
T∑
t=1
I
[
d(NE2², ft) ≥ δ
]
→ 0
where I is the indicator function. Let Qδ be the set of q such that d(q,NE2²) ≥ δ.
This set is compact, so each Qδ is asymptotically unused. Let wδ be the function
which proves this. Since wδ(ft) ≥ I
[
d(NE2², ft) ≥ δ
]
(with equality on Qδ), the
above claim follows since 1T
∑T
t=1wδ(ft)→ 0.
Now let us prove that d
(
1
T
∑T
t=1Xt, Convex(NE2²)
)
→ 0 with probability
one. First, note that calibration implies 1T
∑T
t=1Xt → 1T
∑T
t=1ft (just take w
to be the constant test function to see this). Now the above statement directly
implies that 1T
∑T
t=1ft must converge into the set Convex(NE2²).
4 A Deterministically Calibrated Algorithm
We now provide an algorithm that is uniformly, weakly calibrated for a con-
structive proof of theorem 1. For technical reasons, it is simpler to allow our
algorithm to make forecasts which are not valid probability distributions — the
forecasts lie in the expanded set ∆˜, defined as:
∆˜ = {f :
∑
k∈Ω
f [k] = 1 and f [k] ≥ −²}
so clearly ∆ ⊂ ∆˜, where ∆ is the probability simplex in R|Ω|. We later show that
we can run this algorithm and simply project its forecasts back onto ∆ (which
does not alter our convergence results).
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Similar to Subsection 2.2, consider a triangulation over this larger set ∆˜ with
vertex set V , and let V (p) be the corners of the simplex which contain p. It useful
to make the following assumptions:
1. If p, q are in the same simplex in the triangulation, |p− q| ≤ ².
2. Associated with each v ∈ V we have a test function wv which satisfies:
(a) If v /∈ V (p), then wv(p) = 0.
(b) For all p ∈ ∆˜, ∑v wv(p) = 1 and ∑v wv(p)v = p.
3. For convenience, assume ² is small enough (² ≤ 14|Ω| ) suffices) such that for
all p, q ∈ ∆˜, we have |p− q| ≤ 3 (whereas for all p, q ∈ ∆, |p− q| ≤ 2).
In the first subsection, we present an algorithm, Forecast the Fixed Point,
which (uniformly) drives the calibration error to 0 for those functions wv. As
advertised, the algorithm simply forecasts a fixed point of a particular function.
It turns out that these fixed points can be computed efficiently (by tracking how
the function changes at each timestep), but we do not discuss this here. The next
subsection provides the analysis of this algorithm, which uses an “approachabil-
ity” argument along with properties of the fixed point. Finally, we take ² → 0
which drives the calibration error to 0 (at a bounded rate) for any Lipschitz
continuous test function, thus proving uniform, weak calibration.
4.1 The Algorithm: Forecast the Fixed Point
For notational convenience, we use µT (v) instead of µT (wv, X, F ), ie
µT (v) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
wv(ft)(Xt − ft)
For v ∈ V , define a function ρT (v) which moves v along the direction of calibra-
tion error µT (v), ie
ρT (v) = v + µT (v)
For an arbitrary point p ∈ ∆˜, define ρT (p) by interpolating on V . Since p =∑
v∈V wv(p)v, define ρT (p) as:
ρT (p) =
∑
v∈V
wv(p)ρT (v)
= p+
∑
v∈V
wv(p)µT (v)
Clearly, this definition is consistent with the above when p ∈ V . In the following
section, we show that ρT maps ∆˜ into ∆˜, which allows us to prove that ρT has
a fixed point in ∆˜ (using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem).
The algorithm, Forecast the Fixed Point, chooses a forecast f ∈ ∆˜ at time T
which is any fixed point of the function ρT−1, ie:
1. At time T = 1, set µ0(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V .
2. At time T , compute a fixed point of ρT−1.
3. Forecast this fixed point.
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4.2 The Analysis of This Algorithm
First, let us prove the algorithm exists.
Lemma 5. (Existence) For all X and T , a fixed point of ρT exists in ∆˜. Fur-
thermore, the forecast fT at time T satisfies:∑
v∈V
wv(fT )µT−1(v) = 0
Proof. We use Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to prove existence, which involves
proving that: 1) the mapping is into, ie ρT : ∆˜ → ∆˜ and 2) the mapping is
continuous. First, let us show that ρT (v) ∈ ∆˜ for points v ∈ V . We know
ρT (v) = v +
1
T
T∑
t=1
wv(ft)(Xt − ft)
=
(
1− 1
T
T∑
t=1
wv(ft)
)
v +
1
T
T∑
t=1
wv(ft)(Xt + v − ft)
It suffices to prove thatXt+v−ft is in ∆˜ (when wv(ft) > 0), since then the above
would be in ∆˜ (by the convexity of ∆˜). Note that wv(ft) = 0 when |v − ft| > ².
Now if |v − ft| ≤ ², then v − ft perturbs each component of Xt by at most ²,
which implies that Xt + v − ft ∈ ∆˜ since Xt ∈ ∆. For general points p ∈ ∆˜, the
mapping ρT (p) must also be in ∆, since the mapping is an interpolation. The
mapping is also continuous since the wv’s are continuous. Hence, a fixed point
exists. The last equation follows by setting ρT−1(fT ) = fT . uunionsq
Now let us bound the summed l2 error, where ||x|| =
√
x · x.
Lemma 6. (Error Bound) For any X, we have∑
v∈V
||µT (v)||2 ≤ 9
T
Proof. It is more convenient to work with the unnormalized quantity rT (v) =
TµT (v) =
∑T
t=1wv(ft)(Xt − ft). Note that
||rT (v)||2 = ||rT−1(v)||2 + wv(fT )2||XT − fT ||2 + 2wv(fT )rT−1(v) · (XT − fT )
Summing the last term over V , we have∑
v∈V
wv(fT )rT−1(v) · (XT − fT ) = T (XT − fT ) ·
∑
v∈V
wv(fT )µT−1(v)
= 0
where we have used the fixed point condition of the previous lemma. Summing
the middle term over V and using ||XT − fT || ≤ |XT − fT | ≤ 3, we have:∑
v∈V
wv(fT )2||XT − fT ||2 ≤ 9
∑
v∈V
wv(fT )2
≤ 9
∑
v∈V
wv(fT )
= 9
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Using these bounds along with some recursion, we have∑
v∈V
||rT (v)||2 ≤
∑
v∈V
||rT−1(v)||2 + 9
≤ 9T
The result follows by normalizing (ie by dividing the above by T 2). uunionsq
4.3 Completing the Proof for Uniform, Weak Calibration
Let g be an arbitrary Lipschitz function with Lipschitz parameter λg, ie |g(a)−
g(b)| ≤ λg|a− b|. We can use V to create an approximation of g as follows
gˆ(p) =
∑
v∈V
g(v)wv(p).
This is a good approximation in the sense that:
|gˆ(p)− g(p)| ≤ ²λg
which follows from the Lipschitz condition and the fact that p =
∑
v∈V wv(p)v.
Throughout this section we let F be “Forecast the Fixed Point”. Using the
definition of µT (g,X, F ) along with |Xt − ft| ≤ 3, we have
|µT (g,X, F )| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
gˆ(ft)(Xt − ft)
∣∣∣∣∣+ 3²λg = |µT (gˆ, X, F )|+ 3²λg
Continuing and using our shorthand notation of µT (v),
|µT (gˆ, X, F )| =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
∑
v∈V
g(v)wv(ft)(Xt − ft)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
v∈V
g(v)µT (wv, X, F )
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
v∈V
|µT (v)|
≤
√
|V |
∑
v∈V
||µT (v)||2
where the first inequality follows from the fact that g(v) ≤ 1, and the last from
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Using these inequalities along with lemma 6, we have
|µT (g,X, F )| ≤
√
9|V |
T
+ 3²λg
Thus, for any fixed g we can pick ² small enough to kill off λg This unfor-
tunately implies that |V | is large (since the vertex set size grow with 1/²). But
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we can make T large enough to kill off this |V |. To get convergence to precisely
zero, we follow the usual approach of slowly tightening the parameters. This will
be done in phases. Each phase will half the value of the target accuracy and will
be long enough to cover the burn in part of the following phase (where error
accrues).
Our proof is essentially complete, except for the fact that the algorithm F
described so far could sometimes forecast outside the simplex (with probabilities
greater than 1 or less than zero). To avoid this, we can project a forecast in ∆˜
onto the closest point in ∆. Let P (·) be such a projection operator. For any
f ∈ ∆˜, we have |P (f)− f | ≤ |Ω|². Thus, for any Lipschitz weighting function w
we have
µT (w,X,P ◦ F ) =
∑
v∈V
w(P (ft))(Xt − P (ft))
=
∑
v∈V
w(P (ft))(Xt − ft) +
∑
v∈V
w(P (ft))(ft − P (ft))
≤ µT (w ◦ P,X, F ) + |Ω|²
Hence the projected version also converges to 0 as ² → 0 (since w ◦ P is also
Lipschitz continuous). Theorem 1 follows.
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